The yield question. The GENIUS Act prohibits stablecoin issuers from paying interest or yield to holders. Congress did not want stablecoins competing with bank deposits by offering passive returns funded by the reserves backing the stablecoin. We recognize that concern and that Congress spoke unequivocally on the issue.

The problem is that the OCC's proposed rule extends the prohibition beyond issuers to "related third parties", a category that, as drafted, sweeps in independent distribution partners that happen to co-brand or "white label" a stablecoin. A distributor that receives a commercial fee for providing a wallet interface and brand, and then independently decides to spend some of that fee on user incentives, is not an issuer paying yield from reserve earnings. It is a business competing for customers with its own money, as every business does. Congress drew this line deliberately, and twice rejected amendments that would have extended the prohibition to non-issuers. The OCC's rule should respect that line.

The DeFi question. When a MetaMask user deposits their stablecoin into Aave or Morpho to earn lending yield, they are making an active investment decision that involves deploying their own assets into a protocol, accepting protocol risk, earning yield from borrowers in that market. That is not the issuer paying them to hold a stablecoin. The GENIUS Act itself carves non-custodial software interfaces out of regulated intermediary status. The final rule should confirm this applies to DeFi access as well.

The multi-brand question. The OCC is considering prohibiting a single licensed issuer from supporting multiple co-branded stablecoins. We think disclosure is the right instrument here, not prohibition. If the concern is that holders don't know which reserves back their stablecoin, tell them. Require issuers to prominently identify themselves and disclose how reserve pools are structured. If that is not sufficient, pool segregation (requiring dedicated reserves for each brand) is a proportionate structural remedy. Prohibition forecloses the distribution model entirely rather than managing the risk it presents, and puts OCC-supervised issuers at a disadvantage relative to FDIC-supervised issuers, who face no equivalent restriction.

The stablecoin market is still taking shape. The rules written now will determine whether it develops as a competitive, broadly accessible payments infrastructure or consolidates around a small number of institutions large enough to bear every regulatory obligation themselves. It determines how US regulated stablecoins will fair in competition with foreign stablecoins. We appreciate the OCC consider what we have to contribute.

Read our letter to Treasury Department in full.