# ▶ MythX

REPORT 5F6C898C	492A590019ABC23D			
Created	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:56:48 G	MT+0000 (Cc	oordinated Uni	versal Time)
Number of analyses	30			
User	mueller.berndt11@gmail.com			

# REPORT SUMMARY

Analyses ID	Main source file	Detected vulnerabilities
64072149-95e1-4d05-81d5-e4208ec04a6a	contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol	5
aa0471eb-41a9-425c-919f-c039e9bec79b	contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry.sol	5
787b5a58-ab84-4997-9769-1a9cb250789b	contracts/flashloan/base/FlashLoanReceiverBase.sol	2
aa5c3fc8-e82a-49b4-b7ec-5b974c474ba9	contracts/lendingpool/DefaultReserveInterestRateStrategy.sol	5
0d66d682-635b-4584-9cef-c06f9aebc452	contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol	6
fcb20a27-ea34-4c2c-8337-4b6080c86416	contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolCollateralManager.sol	6
23ab2d22-b300-4bc8-92c4-416d329e1f38	contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolConfigurator.sol	18
1f29afcc-4ca0-44d5-b5b1-e18baf5fe1a9	contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolStorage.sol	2
cdda6dbe-d81a-44ef-bb74-3aa6875cf4af	contracts/libraries/configuration/ReserveConfiguration.sol	2
c9046ec5-f746-4833-95d3-cf9748f0eaaa	contracts/libraries/configuration/UserConfiguration.sol	1
5dace3c5-59c8-4c59-837a-23c372e566f3	contracts/libraries/helpers/Errors.sol	1
3c3b9416-2983-4992-a084-7a564e270296	contracts/libraries/helpers/Helpers.sol	8
6022a28e-9b87-4987-a9d6-dc17290fb2b8	contracts/libraries/logic/GenericLogic.sol	2
e071d582-e0a5-465c-b949-4edb02623c9d	contracts/libraries/logic/ReserveLogic.sol	2
b5723ab5-6725-4541-af0b-f07c760417c4	contracts/libraries/logic/ValidationLogic.sol	4
70bf2cfb-9d4c-408f-a452-6a400561d106	contracts/libraries/math/MathUtils.sol	1
e56dd809-edd6-403a-9954-4eb8cb298588	math/PercentageMath.sol	1
3656f064-b54a-4a01-ad11-908d3da38b1b	contracts/libraries/math/SafeMath.sol	0
2251e105-ace4-4c41-a907-827f212451ec	math/WadRayMath.sol	1
852fe9ee-1457-4089-b3a2-19874a1c1f2a	contracts/misc/AaveProtocolTestHelpers.sol	5

22d0c0ba-6cb6-4fdf-8fc4-8da514a01ed8	contracts/misc/Address.sol	0
bfd056ae-a898-484d-9996-0d6be2220d53	contracts/misc/ChainlinkProxyPriceProvider.sol	3
7b69a08c-ed60-46fa-88e6-af537fd929fb	contracts/misc/IERC20DetailedBytes.sol	1
0890c604-4286-4b95-a6ef-1bd45ebbdd69	misc/SafeERC20.sol	0
587fd904-4ae8-4f58-a36f-381ae9fb99f1	contracts/misc/WalletBalanceProvider.sol	5
5e9b5f59-7cbd-4fb7-adb3-f43704ea2a31	contracts/tokenization/AToken.sol	59
4dcb9ffa-3855-4e7d-af3a-584ef34ba7c4	tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol	3
0c813c52-8d60-46ab-bfca-838632e2f8dd	contracts/tokenization/StableDebtToken.sol	7
<u>c735bc1c-fa4a-4e89-9725-ceabbd2138bc</u>	contracts/tokenization/VariableDebtToken.sol	8
48db364a-404d-4867-afab-71437ab170c0	contracts/tokenization/base/DebtTokenBase.sol	8

# Analysis 64072149-95e1-4d05-81d5-e4208ec04a6a

### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:58:18 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	1	4

# ISSUES

MEDIUM	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.
SWC-113	This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).
Source file	
contracts/config	uration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol

# Locations

132	<pre>if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {</pre>
133	<pre>proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();</pre>
134	<pre>proxy.initialize(newAddress, address(this), params);</pre>
135	_addresses[id] = address(proxy);
136	<pre>emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));</pre>

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*^0.6.8"\*. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file

3

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Locations

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0
2 pragma solidity ^0.6.8

4 import {Ownable} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol';

LOW SWC-107

### Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

 $\verb|contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol||$ 

### Locations





Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol Locations

- 132 if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {
- 133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
- 134 proxy.initialize(newAddress, address(this), params);
- 135 \_addresses[id] = address(proxy);
- 136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));



A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Locations

136	<pre>emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));</pre>
137	} else {
138	<pre>proxy.upgradeToAndCall(newAddress, params);</pre>
139	}
140	}

# Analysis aa0471eb-41a9-425c-919f-c039e9bec79b

### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:58:21 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	1	4

# ISSUES

MEDIUM Loop over unbounded data structure. Gas consumption in function "\_addToAddressesProvidersLis

Gas consumption in function "\_addToAddressesProvidersList" in contract "LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry" depends on the size of data structures or values that may grow swc-128 unboundedly. If the data structure grows too large, the gas required to execute the code will exceed the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an

attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

### Source file

```
contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry.sol
```

### Locations

```
75 **/
76 function _addToAddressesProvidersList(address provider) internal {
77 for (uint256 i = 0; i < addressesProvidersList length; i++) {
78 if (addressesProvidersList[i] == provider) {
79 return;</pre>
```

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*^0.6.8"\*. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry.sol
Locations

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0
2 pragma solidity ^0.6.8.
3
4 import {Ownable} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol';

LC	W	State variable visibility is not set.
SWC	-108	It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "addressesProviders" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private.
Source fi	le	
contract	s/configu	ration/LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry.sol
Locations	S	
15		
16	contract l	<pre>LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry is Ownable, ILendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry {</pre>
17	mapping(ac	ddress => uint256) <mark>addressesProviders</mark> ;
18	address[]	addressesProvidersList;
	1	

State variable visibility is not set.

SWC-108

It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "addressesProvidersList" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private.

### Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry.sol Locations

16 | contract LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry is Ownable, ILendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry {

mapping(address => uint256) addressesProviders; 17

address[] addressesProvidersList; 18

19 20 /\*\*

LOW Loop over unbounded data structure.

Gas consumption in function "getAddressesProvidersList" in contract "LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry" depends on the size of data structures or values that may grow unboundedly. If the data structure grows too large, the gas required to execute the code will exceed the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an SWC-128 attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

### Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProviderRegistry.sol Locations

41 | address[] memory activeProviders = new address[](maxLength); 42 for (uint256 i = 0; i < addressesProvidersList length; i++) {</pre> 43 44  $if \ (addressesProviders[addressesProvidersList[i]] > 0) \ \{$ activeProviders[i] = addressesProvidersList[i]; 45

# Analysis 787b5a58-ab84-4997-9769-1a9cb250789b

### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:58:24 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Flashloan/Base/FlashLoanReceiverBase.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	0	2

# ISSUES

LOW	A floating pragma is set.
SWC-103	The current pragma Solidity directive is "*^0.6.8". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.
Source file	
contracts/flash	Loan/base/FlashLoanReceiverBase.sol

```
Locations
```



LOW

Unused state variable "\_addressesProvider".

The state variable "\_addressesProvider" is declared within the contract "FlashLoanReceiverBase" but its value does not seem to be used anywhere. SWC-131

Source file

contracts/flashloan/base/FlashLoanReceiverBase.sol

Locations

13 using SafeMath for uint256;
14
15 ILendingPoolAddressesProvider internal \_addressesProvider;
16
17 constructor(ILendingPoolAddressesProvider provider) public {

# Analysis aa5c3fc8-e82a-49b4-b7ec-5b974c474ba9

# MythX

### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:58:29 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Lendingpool/DefaultReserveInterestRateStrategy.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		(LOW
0	1	4

# ISSUES

MEDIUM	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.
SWC-113	This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).
urce file	

### Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol

## Locations

132 if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {
133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
134 proxy initialize(newAddress\_address(this), params;
135 \_\_addresses[id] = address(proxy);

136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/DefaultReserveInterestRateStrategy.sol Locations

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0
2 pragma selidity ^0.6.8
3

4 import {SafeMath} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol';

LOW SWC-107

### Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol

### Locations





Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol Locations

- 132 if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {
- 133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
- 134 proxy.initialize(newAddress, address(this), params);
- 135 \_addresses[id] = address(proxy);
- 136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));



A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Locations

136	<pre>emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));</pre>
137	} else {
138	<pre>proxy.upgradeToAndCall(newAddress, params)</pre>
139	}
140	}

# Analysis 0d66d682-635b-4584-9cef-c06f9aebc452

Started	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:58:50 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 12:44:07 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Lendingpool/LendingPool.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
1	0	5

# ISSUES

HIC	HIGH The arithmetic operation can overflow.	The arithmetic operation can overflow.
SWC	-101	It is possible to cause an arithmetic overflow. Prevent the overflow by constraining inputs using the require() statement or use the OpenZeppelin SafeMath library for integer arithmetic operations. Refer to the transaction trace generated for this issue to reproduce the overflow.
Source fil	le	
contracts	s/libra	ries/math/MathUtils.sol
Locations	6	
56	}	
57		
58	uint256	expMinusOne = <mark>exp - 1</mark> ;
59		
60	uint256	expMinusTwo = exp > 2 ? exp - 2 : 0;
LO	W	A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0

pragma solidity <mark>^0.6.8</mark>; 2

3 pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;

Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).

# SWC-123

# Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

# Locations

717	
718	return (
719	<pre>IERC20(asset).balanceOf(reserve_aTokenAddress),</pre>
720	$\label{eq:linear} \\ IERC20 (\texttt{reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress}) . \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ $
721	<pre>IERC20(reserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).totalSupply(),</pre>



Unused function parameter "from".

The value of the function parameter "from" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

### Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol
Locations

247	
248	<pre>function _beforeTokenTransfer(</pre>
249	<mark>address from</mark> ,
250	address to,
251	uint256 amount

LOW Unused function parameter "to".

The value of the function parameter "to" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations



Unused function parameter "amount".

The value of the function parameter "amount" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

SWC-131

Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol

# Locations

address from,
address to,
uint256 <mark>amount</mark>
) internal virtual {}
}

Started	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:58:50 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 12:44:05 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Беер
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Lendingpool/LendingPoolCollateralManager.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	0	6

# ISSUES

LOW A float The currer SWC-103

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.8". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

### Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolCollateralManager.sol Locations
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0

2	pragma solidity <mark>^0.6.8</mark> ;
3	
4	<pre>import {SafeMath} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol';</pre>

LOW

Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

 SWC-113
 This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/libraries/helpers/Helpers.sol

# Locations

23 {
24 return (
25 DebtTokenBase(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).balanceOf(user),
26 DebtTokenBase(reserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).balanceOf(user),
27 );

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally SWC-113 by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/libraries/helpers/Helpers.sol

### Locations

24	return (
25	$\label{eq:constraint} DebtTokenBase (reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).balanceOf(user), \\$
26	<pre>DebtTokenBase(reserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).balanceOf(user)</pre>
27	);
28	}



Unused function parameter "from".

The value of the function parameter "from" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

### Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol
Locations

247	
248	<pre>function _beforeTokenTransfer(</pre>
249	<mark>address from</mark> ,
250	address to,
251	uint256 amount

LOW Unused function parameter "to".

The value of the function parameter "to" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations



Unused function parameter "amount".

The value of the function parameter "amount" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

SWC-131

Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol

# Locations

249	address from,
250	address to,
251	uint256 <mark>amount</mark>
252	) internal virtual {}
253	}

# Analysis 23ab2d22-b300-4bc8-92c4-416d329e1f38

## Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:58:49 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Lendingpool/LendingPoolConfigurator.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	0	18

# ISSUES

LOW	A floating pragma is set.
SWC-103	The current pragma Solidity directive is "*^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.
Source file	
contracts/lendir	ngpool/LendingPoolConfigurator.sol
Locations	

# 1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0 pragma solidity ^0.6.8

3 pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;

LOW

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

SWC-113 This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

600	**/
601	<pre>function setPoolPause(bool val) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
602	<pre>pool.setPause(val);</pre>
603	}
604	}

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally SWC-113 by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/Le	endingPoolConfigurator.sol
--------------------------	----------------------------

### Locations

550	onlyAaveAdmin
551	{
552	<pre>pool.setReserveInterestRateStrategyAddress(asset, rateStrategyAddress);</pre>
553	<pre>emit ReserveInterestRateStrategyChanged(asset, rateStrategyAddress);</pre>
554	}

LOW

SWC-113

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

### Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolConfigurator.sol
Locations

**/
<pre>function disableReserveAsCollateral(address asset) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = <pre>pool.getConfiguration(asset);</pre>
<pre>currentConfig.setLtv(0);</pre>

LOW Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

 SWC-113
 This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

# Source file

369	**/
370	<pre>function enableReserveStableRate(address asset) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
371	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = <pre>pool.getConfiguration(asset</pre>
372	
373	<pre>currentConfig.setStableRateBorrowingEnabled(true);</pre>

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally SWC-113 by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/	/LendingPoolC	onfigurator.sol
------------------------	---------------	-----------------

Locations

318	**/
319	<pre>function disableBorrowingOnReserve(address asset) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
320	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = <pre>pool.getConfiguration(asset)</pre>
321	
322	<pre>currentConfig.setBorrowingEnabled(false);</pre>

LOW

SWC-113

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolConfigurator.sol
Locations

456	**/
457	<pre>function unfreezeReserve(address asset) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
458	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = <pre>pool.getConfiguration(asset);</pre>
459	
460	<pre>currentConfig.setFrozen(false);</pre>

LOW Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

502	**/
503	<pre>function setLiquidationThreshold(address asset, uint256 threshold) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
504	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = <pre>pool.getConfiguration(asset);</pre>
505	
506	<pre>currentConfig.setLiquidationThreshold(threshold);</pre>

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally SWC-113 by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/	/LendingPoo	lConfigurator	.sol
------------------------	-------------	---------------	------

Locations

383	**/
384	<pre>function disableReserveStableRate(address asset) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
385	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = pool.getConfiguration(asset)
386	
387	<pre>currentConfig.setStableRateBorrowingEnabled(false);</pre>

LOW

SWC-113

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolConfigurator.sol
Locations

397	**/
398	<pre>function activateReserve(address asset) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
399	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = <pre>pool.getConfiguration(asset);</pre>
400	
401	<pre>currentConfig.setActive(true);</pre>

LOW Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

 SWC-113
 This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

517	**/
518	<pre>function setLiquidationBonus(address asset, uint256 bonus) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
519	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = pool.getConfiguration(asset);
520	
521	<pre>currentConfig.setLiquidationBonus(bonus);</pre>

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally SWC-113 by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool	/LendingPool	lConfigurator	.sol
-----------------------	--------------	---------------	------

Locations

442	**/
443	<pre>function freezeReserve(address asset) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
444	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = pool.getConfiguration(asset
445	
446	<pre>currentConfig.setFrozen(true);</pre>

LOW

SWC-113

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolConfigurator.sol
Locations

532	**/
533	<pre>function setReserveDecimals(address asset, uint256 decimals) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
534	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = <pre>pool.getConfiguration(asset);</pre>
535	
536	<pre>currentConfig.setDecimals(decimals);</pre>

LOW Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

471	**/
472	<pre>function setLtv(address asset, uint256 ltv) external onlyAaveAdmin {</pre>
473	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = pool.getConfiguration(asset;
474	
475	<pre>currentConfig.setLtv(ltv);</pre>

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally SWC-113 by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/	/LendingPoo	lConfigurator	.sol
------------------------	-------------	---------------	------

Locations

486	**/
487	function setReserveFactor(address asset, uint256 reserveFactor) external onlyAaveAdmin
488	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = <pre>pool.getConfiguration(asset);</pre>
489	
490	<pre>currentConfig.setReserveFactor(reserveFactor);</pre>

LOW

SWC-113

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolConfigurator.sol
Locations

339	uint256 liquidationBonus
340	) external onlyAaveAdmin {
341	<pre>ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = pool.getConfiguration(asset;</pre>
342	
343	<pre>currentConfig.setLtv(ltv);</pre>

LOW Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

303	onlyAaveAdmin
304	{
305	ReserveConfiguration.Map memory currentConfig = <pre>pool.getConfiguration(asset</pre>
306	
307	<pre>currentConfig.setBorrowingEnabled(true);</pre>

Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolConfigurator.sol

## Locations

197	<pre>function initialize(ILendingPoolAddressesProvider provider) public initializer {</pre>
198	addressesProvider = provider;
199	<pre>pool = ILendingPool(addressesProvider.getLendingPool());</pre>
200	}

# Analysis 1f29afcc-4ca0-44d5-b5b1-e18baf5fe1a9

### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:58:54 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Lendingpool/LendingPoolStorage.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	1	1

# ISSUES

MEDIUM An assertion violation was triggered.

SWC-110 It is possible to trigger an assertion violation. Note that Solidity assert() statements should only be used to check invariants. Review the transaction trace generated for this issue and either make sure your program logic is correct, or use require() instead of assert() if your goal is to constrain user inputs or enforce preconditions. Remember to validate inputs from both callers (for instance, via passed arguments) and callees (for instance, via return values).

### Source file

contract	s/libraries/logic/ReserveLogic.sol
Locations	
133	{
134	require(
135	ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.STABLE == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode:interestRateMode.
136	ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.VARIABLE == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode(interestRateMode),
137	Errors.INVALID_INTEREST_RATE_MODE_SELECTED

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*0.6.8". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file contracts/lendingpool/LendingPoolStorage.sol

# Locations

3

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0

pragma solidity <mark>^0.6.8</mark>;

4 import {UserConfiguration} from '../libraries/configuration/UserConfiguration.sol';

Analysis cdda6dbe-d81a-44ef-bb74-3aa6875cf4	la†
---------------------------------------------	-----

### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:58:59 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Libraries/Configuration/ReserveConfiguration.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		LOW
0	1	1

# ISSUES

### MEDIUM An assertion violation was triggered.

SWC-110

It is possible to trigger an assertion violation. Note that Solidity assert() statements should only be used to check invariants. Review the transaction trace generated for this issue and either make sure your program logic is correct, or use require() instead of assert() if your goal is to constrain user inputs or enforce preconditions. Remember to validate inputs from both callers (for instance, via passed arguments) and callees (for instance, via return values).

### Source file

contract	s/libraries/logic/ReserveLogic.sol
Locations	
133	{
134	require(
135	ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.STABLE == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode interestRateMode
136	ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.VARIABLE == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode(interestRateMode),
137	Errors.INVALID_INTEREST_RATE_MODE_SELECTED
	1

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*0.6.8". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

### Source file

contracts/libraries/configuration/ReserveConfiguration.sol Locations

> 1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0 pragma solidity <mark>^0.6.8</mark>; 2 3

import {SafeMath} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol'; 4

### Analysis c9046ec5-f746-4833-95d3-cf9748f0eaaa

## Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:03 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Libraries/Configuration/UserConfiguration.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	0	1

LOW	A floating pragma is set.
SWC-103	The current pragma Solidity directive is "*^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.
Source file	
contracts/libra	ries/configuration/UserConfiguration.sol
Locations	

1	// SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0
2	pragma solidity <mark>^0.6.8</mark>
3	
4	<pre>import {SafeMath} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol';</pre>

# Analysis 5dace3c5-59c8-4c59-837a-23c372e566f3

# **W** MythX

## Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:05 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Libraries/Helpers/Errors.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		(LOW
0	0	1

LOW SWC-103	A floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.		
Source file contracts/libraries/helpers/Errors.sol Locations			
1 // SPD 2 pragma 3 4 /**	(-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0 solidity ^0.6.8		

# Analysis 3c3b9416-2983-4992-a084-7a564e270296

# MythX

### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:08 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Libraries/Helpers/Helpers.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		(LOW
0	1	7

# ISSUES

MED	MUIC	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.		
SWC	-113	This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).		
Source fi	ile			
contract	:ontracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol			
Location	s			
132	if (prox	<pre>vAddress == address(0)) {</pre>		
133	proxy =	new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();		
134	<mark>proxy.in</mark>	itialize( <b>newAddress</b> , address(this), <b>params</b> ;		
135	_address	es[id] = address(proxy);		

136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));

LOW

3

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is \*\*^0.6.8\*\*. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file contracts/libraries/helpers/Helpers.sol Locations

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0

2 pragma solidity ^0.6.8;

4 import {DebtTokenBase} from '../../tokenization/base/DebtTokenBase.sol';

LOW SWC-107

### Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

 $\verb|contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol||$ 

### Locations





Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol Locations

- 132 if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {
- 133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
- 134 proxy.initialize(newAddress, address(this), params);
- 135 \_addresses[id] = address(proxy);
- 136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));



A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Locations

<pre>emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));</pre>
} else {
<pre>proxy.upgradeToAndCall(newAddress, params)</pre>
}
}

Unused function parameter "from".

SWC-131

Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol

### Locations

247	
248	<pre>function _beforeTokenTransfer(</pre>
249	<mark>address from</mark> ,
250	address to,
251	uint256 amount
249 250 251	address from, address to, uint256 amount

LOW

Unused function parameter "to".

The value of the function parameter "to" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

The value of the function parameter "from" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations



LOW Unused function parameter "amount".

The value of the function parameter "amount" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations

249	address from,
250	address to,
251	<mark>uint256 amount</mark>
252	) internal virtual {}
253	}

# Analysis 6022a28e-9b87-4987-a9d6-dc17290fb2b8

# MythX

### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:12 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Libraries/Logic/GenericLogic.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		LOW
0	1	1

# ISSUES

### MEDIUM An assertion violation was triggered.

It is possible to trigger an assertion violation. Note that Solidity assert() statements should only be used to check invariants. Review the transaction trace generated for this issue and either make sure your program logic is correct, or use require() instead of assert() if your goal is to constrain user inputs or enforce preconditions. Remember to validate inputs from both SWC-110 callers (for instance, via passed arguments) and callees (for instance, via return values).

### Source file

contracts/libraries/logic/ReserveLogic.sol				
Locations	Locations			
133	{			
134	require(			
135	ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.STABLE == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.interestRateMode.			
136	ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.VARIABLE == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode(interestRateMode),			
137	Errors.INVALID_INTEREST_RATE_MODE_SELECTED			

# LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*0.6.8". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file contracts/libraries/logic/GenericLogic.sol Locations

// SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0

pragma solidity ^0.6.8;

3 pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;

# Analysis e071d582-e0a5-465c-b949-4edb02623c9d

### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:16 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Libraries/Logic/ReserveLogic.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		(LOW
0	1	1

# ISSUES

### MEDIUM An assertion violation was triggered.

It is possible to trigger an assertion violation. Note that Solidity assert() statements should only be used to check invariants. Review the transaction trace generated for this issue and either make sure your program logic is correct, or use require() instead of assert() if your goal is to constrain user inputs or enforce preconditions. Remember to validate inputs from both SWC-110 callers (for instance, via passed arguments) and callees (for instance, via return values).

### Source file

contract	s/libraries/logic/ReserveLogic.sol			
Locations	Locations			
133	{			
134	require(			
135	ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.STABLE == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode interestRateMode			
136	ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.VARIABLE == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode(interestRateMode),			
137	Errors.INVALID_INTEREST_RATE_MODE_SELECTED			

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*0.6.8". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file contracts/libraries/logic/ReserveLogic.sol Locations

3

4

// SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0

pragma solidity <mark>^0.6.8</mark>;

import {SafeMath} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol';

# Analysis b5723ab5-6725-4541-af0b-f07c760417c4

# Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:21 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Libraries/Logic/ValidationLogic.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		(LOW
0	0	4

# ISSUES

LO\	A floating pragma is set.	
SWC-2	The current pragma Solidity directive is "*^0.6.8". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.	
Source file		
contracts	praries/logic/ValidationLogic.sol	
Locations		
1	PDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0 ma solidity ^0.6.8	
3	ma experimental ABIEncoderV2;	

LOW Unused function parameter "from".

The value of the function parameter "from" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

# SWC-131

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations



### Unused function parameter "to".

SWC-131

Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol

Locations



LOW

Unused function parameter "amount".

The value of the function parameter "amount" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

The value of the function parameter "to" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

### Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol
Locations

249address from,250address to,251vint256 amount252) internal virtual {}253}

### Analysis 70bf2cfb-9d4c-408f-a452-6a400561d106

# Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:26 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time

Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21

Main Source File Contracts/Libraries/Math/MathUtils.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		(LOW
0	0	1

	LO	W A floating pragma is set.		
	SWC	The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.		
So co Lo	Source file contracts/libraries/math/MathUtils.sol Locations			
	1 2 3	// SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0 pragma solidity ^0.6.8		
	4	<pre>import {SafeMath} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol';</pre>		

# Analysis e56dd809-edd6-403a-9954-4eb8cb298588

### Started

Finished Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:28 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Math/PercentageMath.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		LOW
0	0	1

LOW SWC-10	A floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directive is "*^0.6.8*". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.
Source file math/Percen Locations	ageMath.sol
1 // 2 pr 3 4 im	SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0 gmm solidity ^0.6.8. ort (Errors) from '/helpers/Errors.sol';

Analysis	3656†064-b54a-4a01-ad11-908d3da38b1b	<b>W</b> MythX
Started		
Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:30 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)	
Mode	Deep	
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21	
Main Source	File Contracts/Libraries/Math/SafeMath.Sol	

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		LOW
0	0	0
## Analysis 2251e105-ace4-4c41-a907-827f212451ec

## Started

Finished Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:32 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Math/WadRayMath.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	0	1

# ISSUES

LO	LOW A floating pragma is set.	
The current pragma Solidity directive is "*^0.6.8". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.		
Source file		
math/WadR	ath.sol	
Locations		
1	PDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0	
2	ma solidity <mark>/0.6.8</mark> ,	
3		
4	rt {Errors} from '/helpers/Errors.sol';	

## Analysis 852fe9ee-1457-4089-b3a2-19874a1c1f2a

MythX

#### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:34 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Misc/AaveProtocolTestHelpers.Sol

## DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		LOW
0	1	4

## ISSUES

 MEDIUM
 Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

 This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

#### Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol

## Locations

132 if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {
133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
134 proxy\_initialize\_newAddress\_address(this), params;
135 \_addresses[id] = address(proxy);

136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file contracts/misc/AaveProtocolTestHelpers.sol

# Locations

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0

pragma solidity ^0.6.8;

3 pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;

LOW SWC-107

## Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

 $\verb|contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol||$ 

## Locations





Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol Locations

- 132 if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {
- 133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
- 134 proxy.initialize(newAddress, address(this), params);
- 135 \_addresses[id] = address(proxy);
- 136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));



A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Locations

136	<pre>emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));</pre>
137	} else {
138	<pre>proxy.upgradeToAndCall(newAddress, params)</pre>
139	}
140	}

	Analysis 22d0c0ba-6cb	o6-4fdf-8fc4-8da514a01ed8	W MythX
	Started		
F	Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:37 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)	
ſ	Mode	Deep	
(	Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21	
ſ	Main Source File	Contracts/Misc/Address.Sol	

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		(LOW
0	0	0

ISSUES

## Analysis bfd056ae-a898-484d-9996-0d6be2220d53

#### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:39 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Misc/ChainlinkProxyPriceProvider.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		(LOW
0	0	3

# ISSUES

LOW	A floating pragma is set.
SWC-10	The current pragma Solidity directive is "*^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.
Source file contracts/m Locations	sc/ChainlinkProxyPriceProvider.sol
1 // 2 pra	SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0 gma solidity ^0.6.8

4 import {Ownable} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol';

LOW

Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

SWC-113 This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/misc/ChainlinkProxyPriceProvider.sol

Locations

 $|\otimes|$  // If there is no registered source for the asset, call the fallbackOracle

81 if (address(source) == address(0)) {

82 return \_fallbackOracle.getAssetPrice(asset);

83 } else {

84 int256 price = IChainlinkAggregator(source).latestAnswer();

Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file

# contracts/misc/ChainlinkProxyPriceProvider.sol

Locations

80	// If there is no registered source for the asset, call the fallbackOracle
81	<pre>if (address(source) == address(0)) {</pre>
82	<pre>return _fallbackOracle.getAssetPrice(asset);</pre>
83	} else {
84	<pre>int256 price = IChainlinkAggregator(source).latestAnswer();</pre>

# Analysis 7b69a08c-ed60-46fa-88e6-af537fd929fb

## Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:41 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Misc/IERC20DetailedBytes.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		LOW
0	0	1

# ISSUES

LOW SWC-10	A floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directive is "*^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.
Source file contracts/mi Locations	sc/IERC20DetailedBytes.sol
1 // 2 pra 3 4 con	SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0 mma solidity ^0.6.8 cract IERC20Detailed8ytes {

Analysis	0890c604-4286-4b95-a6ef-1bd45ebbdd69	💓 MythX
Started		
Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:43 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)	
Mode	Deep	
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21	
Main Source	File Misc/SafeERC20.Sol	

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	0	0

ISSUES

## Analysis 587fd904-4ae8-4f58-a36f-381ae9fb99f1

## Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:45 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Misc/WalletBalanceProvider.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	1	4

## ISSUES

MEDIUM	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.
SWC-113	This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).
Source file	
contracts/conf	iguration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol

Locations

132 if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {
133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
134 proxy initialize newAddress\_address(this), params;
135 \_addresse[id] = address(proxy);

136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));

LOW

3

4

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file contracts/misc/WalletBalanceProvider.sol Locations

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0

2 pragma solidity ^0.6.8;

import {Address} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol';

LOW SWC-107

## Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

 $\verb|contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol||$ 

## Locations





Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol Locations

- 132 if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {
- 133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
- 134 proxy.initialize(newAddress, address(this), params);
- 135 \_addresses[id] = address(proxy);
- 136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));



A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Locations

<pre>emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));</pre>
} else {
<pre>proxy.upgradeToAndCall(newAddress, params)</pre>
}
}

# Analysis 5e9b5f59-7cbd-4fb7-adb3-f43704ea2a31

Started	Thu Sep 24 2020 12:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 12:45:27 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Tokenization/AToken.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
4	4	51

# ISSUES

HI	GH	The arithmetic operation can overflow.
SWC	-101	It is possible to cause an arithmetic overflow. Prevent the overflow by constraining inputs using the require() statement or use the OpenZeppelin SafeMath library for integer arithmetic operations. Refer to the transaction trace generated for this issue to reproduce the overflow.
Source fi	ile	
contract	s/libra	ries/math/MathUtils.sol
Locations	S	
56	}	
57		
58	uint256	expMinusOne = <mark>exp - 1</mark> ;
59		
60	uint256	expMinusTwo = exp > 2 ? exp - 2 : 0;

HIGH

## The contract delegates execution to another contract with a user-supplied address.

The smart contract delegates execution to a user-supplied address. This could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of this contract account and manipulate the state SWC-112 of the contract account or execute actions on its behalf.

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

## Locations

457	
458	//solium-disable-next-line
459	<pre>(bool success, bytes memory result) = collateralManager.delegatecall(</pre>
460	abi.encodeWithSignature
461	'liquidationCall(address,address,address,uint256,bool)',
462	collateral.
463	asset
464	user_
465	purchaseAmount.
466	receiveAToken
467	1
468	li internetti anternetti anternetti anternetti anternetti anternetti anternetti anternetti anternetti anternetti
469	<pre>require(success, Errors.LIQUIDATION_CALL_FAILED);</pre>

HIGH

## The contract delegates execution to another contract with a user-supplied address.

The smart contract delegates execution to a user-supplied address. This could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of this contract account and manipulate the state SWC-112 of the contract account or execute actions on its behalf.

#### Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol
Locations

504	
505	//solium-disable-next-line
506	(bool success, bytes memory result) = collateralManager.delegateca
507	abi.encodeWithSignature(
508	'repayWithCollateral(address,address,address,uint256,address,bytes
509	collateral,
510	principal.
511	user,
512	principalAmount.
513	receiver _
514	params
515	1
516	<mark>;</mark> ;
517	<pre>require(success, Errors.FAILED_REPAY_WITH_COLLATERAL);</pre>

HIGH

## The contract delegates execution to another contract with a user-supplied address.

The smart contract delegates execution to a user-supplied address. This could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of this contract account and manipulate the state of the contract account or execute actions on its behalf. SWC-112

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

## Locations

620	
621	//solium-disable-next-line
622	(bool success, bytes memory result) = collateralManager.delegatecall(
623	<pre>abi.encodeWithSignature(</pre>
624	<pre>'swapLiquidity(address,address,address,uint256,bytes)',</pre>
625	receiverAddress.
626	fromAsset,
627	toAsset.
628	amountToSwap
629	params
630	1
631	
632	<pre>require(success, Errors.FAILED_COLLATERAL_SWAP);</pre>

MEDIUM Write to persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a user defined address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the

SWC-107

callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

## Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

523	}
524	
525	_flashLiquidationLocked = false
526	}

MEDIUM An assertion violation was triggered.

SWC-110

It is possible to trigger an assertion violation. Note that Solidity assert() statements should only be used to check invariants. Review the transaction trace generated for this issue and either make sure your program logic is correct, or use require() instead of assert() if your goal is to constrain user inputs or enforce preconditions. Remember to validate inputs from both callers (for instance, via passed arguments) and callees (for instance, via return values).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

(uint256 stableDebt, uint256 variableDebt) = Helpers.getUserCurrentDebt(msg.sender, reserve); 317 318 ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode interestRateMode = ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode(rateMode); 319 320 321 ValidationLogic.validateSwapRateMode(

## MEDIUM An assertion violation was triggered.

It is possible to trigger an assertion violation. Note that Solidity assert() statements should only be used to check invariants. Review the transaction trace generated for this issue and either make sure your program logic is correct, or use require() instead of assert() if your goal is to constrain user inputs or enforce preconditions. Remember to validate inputs from both SWC-110 callers (for instance, via passed arguments) and callees (for instance, via return values)

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

Locations

(uint256 stableDebt, uint256 variableDebt) = Helpers.getUserCurrentDebt(onBehalfOf, reserve); 261 262 ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode interestRateMode = ReserveLogic\_InterestRateMode(rateMode; 263 264 //default to max amount 265

#### MEDIUM An assertion violation was triggered.

It is possible to trigger an assertion violation. Note that Solidity assert() statements should only be used to check invariants. Review the transaction trace generated for this issue and either make sure your program logic is correct, or use require() instead of assert() if your goal is to constrain user inputs or enforce preconditions. Remember to validate inputs from both SWC-110 callers (for instance, via passed arguments) and callees (for instance, via return values).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

> 904 905 if ( 
>  ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode(vars.interestRateMode)
>  ==
>  ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.STABLE
>  906 907 currentStableRate = reserve.currentStableBorrowRate; 908

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

```
SWC-103
```

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*^0.6.8"\*. It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file

contracts/tokenization/AToken.sol
Locations

1	<pre>// SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0</pre>
2	pragma solidity <mark>^0.6.8</mark> ;
3	
4	<pre>import {IncentivizedERC20} from './IncentivizedERC20.sol';</pre>

LOW

Read of persistent state following external call

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

) external override view returns (uint256) { 176 return \_borrowAllowance[\_reserves[asset].getDebtTokenAddress(interestRateMode)][fromUser][toUser] 178 179

## Write to persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state. SWC-107

## Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

## Locations

address debtToken = \_reserves[asset].getDebtTokenAddress(interestRateMode); 195 196 197 \_borrowAllowance[debtToken][msg.sender][user] = amount; emit BorrowAllowanceDelegated(asset, msg.sender, user, interestRateMode, amount); 198 199

#### LOW

#### Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state. SWC-107

#### Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

428	);
429	
430	_usersConfig[msg.sender].setUsingAsCollateral( <pre>reserve id</pre> , useAsCollateral);
431	
432	<pre>if (useAsCollateral) {</pre>

LOW Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is

untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

### SWC-107

Source file

contracts/libraries/configuration/UserConfiguration.sol Locations

```
46 ) internal {
    self.data =
47
48
     (self.data \ \delta \ \widetilde{(1 << (reserveIndex * 2 + 1)))} |
     (uint256(_usingAsCollateral ? 1 : 0) << (reserveIndex * 2 + 1));</pre>
49
50
```

## Write to persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

### Source file

contracts/libraries/configuration/UserConfiguration.sol

## Locations

46 ) internal {	
47 <mark>self_data =</mark>	
48 <mark>(self.data &amp; ~(1 &lt;&lt; (reserveIndex * 2 + 1)))  </mark>	
<pre>49 {uint256(_usingAsCollateral ? 1 : 0) &lt;&lt; (reserveIndex * 2 +</pre>	<mark>1))</mark> ;
50 }	

LOW	Read of persistent state following external call
SWC-107	The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the called untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

. . .

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol
Locations



LOW Read of persistent state following external call

 SWC-107
 The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

 Source file contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

 Locations

950	. }
957	if (!reserveAlreadyAdded) $\{$
958	_reserves[asset].id = uint8(_reservesList.length)
959	_reservesList.push(asset);
960	}

#### LOW Write to persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state. SWC-107

```
Source file
```

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

## Locations





#### Write to persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state. SWC-107

#### Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations



LOW Write to persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is

untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

327	);
328	
329	<pre>reserve.updateState();</pre>
330	
331	<pre>if (interestRateMode == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.STABLE</pre>
	I contraction of the second

## Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state. SWC-107

### Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

## Locations

331 if (interestRateMode == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.STABLE) { //burn stable rate tokens, mint variable rate tokens 332 333 IStableDebtToken(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).burn(msg.sender, stableDebt); IVariableDebtToken(reserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).mint( 334

335 msg.sender

#### LOW

SWC-107

#### Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

#### Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations



LOW Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is

untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

## SWC-107

Source file contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

342	msg.sender,
343	variableDebt,
344	reserve_variableBorrowIndex
345	);
346	<pre>IStableDebtToken(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).mint(</pre>

## Write to persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

### Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

## Locations

331	<pre>if (interestRateMode == ReserveLogic.InterestRateMode.STABLE) {</pre>
332	//burn stable rate tokens, mint variable rate tokens
333	IStableDebtToken(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).burn(msg.sender, stableDebt
334	IVariableDebtToken(reserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).mint(

335 msg.sender,

## LOW

SWC-107

#### Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

#### Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol
Locations

332 //burn stable rate tokens, mint variable rate tokens

333 IStableDebtToken(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).burn(msg.sender, stableDebt);

- 334 IVariableDebtToken(reserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).mint(
- 335 msg.sender
- 336 stableDebt,

LOW Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is

## SWC-107

Source file contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

335	msg.sender,
336	stableDebt,
337	<mark>reserve.variableBorrowIndex</mark>
338	);
339	} else {

## Write to persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

### Locations

339	} else {
340	//do the opposite
341	IVariableDebtToken(reserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).burn(
342	msg.sender.
343	variableDebt.
344	reserve variableBorrowIndex
345	<mark>)</mark> ;
346	<pre>IStableDebtToken(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).mint(</pre>
347	msg.sender,

LOW

## Read of persistent state following external call

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol
Locations

344	reserve.variableBorrowIndex
345	);
346	IStableDebtToken( <mark>reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress</mark> ).mint(
347	msg.sender,
348	variableDebt,

LOW Rea

Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

347	msg.sender,
348	variableDebt,
349	<mark>reserve.currentStableBorrowRate</mark>
350	);
351	}

LC	W	Write to persistent state following external call
SWC	-107	The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.
Source fil	le	
contract	s/lendir	ngpool/LendingPool.sol
Locations	6	
332	//burn s	table rate tokens, mint variable rate tokens
333	IStableD	<pre>ebtToken(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).burn(msg.sender, stableDebt);</pre>
334	<mark>IVariabl</mark>	eDebtToken/reserve.variableDebtTokenAddressmint(
335	<mark>msg.send</mark>	er,
336	<mark>stableDe</mark>	bt.
337	<mark>reserve.</mark>	variableBorrowIndex
338	);	
339	} else {	
340	//do the	opposite

## Read of persistent state following external call

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

Locations

351 352 353 reserve.updateInterestRates(asset, reserve.aTokenAddress, 0, 0); 354 emit Swap(asset, msg.sender); 355

LOW Write to persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state. SWC-107

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

Locations

344	reserve.variableBorrowIndex
345	);
346	IStableDebtToken(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).min
347	msg_sender_
348	variableDebt,
349	reserve_currentStableBorrowRate
350	•
351	}

## LOW Write to persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

Locations

351	}
352	
353	<pre>reserve.updateInterestRates(asset, reserve.aTokenAddress, 0, 0);</pre>
354	
355	<pre>emit Swap(asset, msg.sender);</pre>

LOW

SWC-113

### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

#### Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

## Locations

419	<pre>ReserveLogic.ReserveData storage reserve = _reserves[asset];</pre>
420	
421	ValidationLogic.validateSetUseReserveAsCollateral(
422	reserve.
423	asset.
424	_reserves.
425	_usersConfig <sup>™</sup> sg.sender].
426	_reservesList.
427	<pre>_addressesProvider.getPriceOracle()</pre>
428	
429	
430	_usersConfig[msg.sender].setUsingAsCollateral(reserve.id, useAsCollateral);

LOW Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

SWC-113 This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol
Locations

Locations

816	) external override {
817	_onlyLendingPoolConfigurator();
818	<pre>_reserves[asset].init(</pre>
819	aTokenAddress,
820	stableDebtAddress,
821	<mark>variableDebtAddress,</mark>
822	<pre>interestRateStrategyAddress</pre>
823	<mark>)</mark> ;
824	<pre>_addReserveToList(asset);</pre>
825	}

SWC-113

## Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

## Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

## Locations

457	
458	//solium-disable-next-line
459	(bool success, bytes memory result) = <pre>collateralManager delegatecall(</pre>
460	abi.encodeWithSignature(
461	'liquidationCall(address,address,address,uint256,bool)',
462	collateral
463	asset .
464	user -
465	purchaseAmount.
466	receiveAToken
467	1
468	1
469	<pre>require(success, Errors.LIQUIDATION_CALL_FAILED);</pre>

LOW

#### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

## Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

#### Locations

504 //solium-disable-next-line 505 (bool success, bytes memory result) = collateralManager delegatecall( 506 abi.encodeWithSignature 'repayWithCollateral(address,address,address,uint256,address,bytes)' 507 508 <mark>collateral,</mark> 509 <mark>principal,</mark> 510 511 user, principalAmount, 512 513 <mark>receiver,</mark> params 514 515 ) 516 ); 517 require(success, Errors.FAILED\_REPAY\_WITH\_COLLATERAL);

## Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own SWC-113 codebase).

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol

### Locations

718 return (  $\label{eq:IERC20} (\texttt{asset}) \textbf{.balanceOf}(\texttt{reserve}.\texttt{aTokenAddress}) \, ,$ 719

- IERC20(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).totalSupply() 720
- IERC20(reserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).totalSupply(), 721
- 722 reserve.currentLiquidityRate

LOW

SWC-113

#### Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own

#### Source file

contracts/libraries/helpers/Helpers.sol Locations

24	return (
25	$\label{eq:constraint} DebtTokenBase(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).balanceOf(user),$
26	$\label{eq:debt} DebtTokenBase(reserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).balanceOf(user)$
27	);
28	}

LOW Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

SWC-113

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally

Source file

contracts/lendingpool/LendingPool.sol Locations

codebase).



require(success, Errors.FAILED\_COLLATERAL\_SWAP); 632

#### A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are SWC-116 predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

contracts/libraries/logic/ReserveLogic.sol

#### Locations



LOW

## A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file contracts/libraries/logic/ReserveLogic.sol Locations

#### 

LOW

A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

SWC-116 The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

node\_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol Locations

59 \*/

- 60 function sub(uint256 a, uint256 b, string memory errorMessage) internal pure returns (uint256) {
- 61 require(b <= a, errorMessage);</pre>
- 62 uint256 c = a b;

### A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

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Source file

contracts/libraries/math/MathUtils.sol

## Locations

52	<pre>uint256 exp = block.timestamp.sub(uint256(lastUpdateTimestamp));</pre>
53	
54	if (exp == 0) (
55	<pre>return WadRayMath.ray();</pre>
56	1
57	
58	<pre>uint256 expMinusOne = exp - 1;</pre>

LOW

A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

SWC-116 The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

contracts/libraries/math/MathUtils.sol
Locations

58 uint256 expMinusOne = exp - 1; 59 60 uint256 expMinusTwo = exp > 2 ? exp - 2 0; 61 62 uint256 ratePerSecond = rate / SECONDS\_PER\_YEAR;

LOW

A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

SWC-116

into now decision is made based on the block timestamp environment variable.

The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

<pre>contracts/libraries/math/WadRayMath.sol</pre>
Locations

156	<pre>function wadToRay(uint256 a) internal pure returns (uint256) {</pre>
157	<pre>uint256 result = a * WAD_RAY_RATIO;</pre>
158	<pre>require(result / WAD_RAY_RATIO == a, Errors.MULTIPLICATION_OVERFLOW</pre>
159	return result;
160	}

## A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

The block timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of SWC-116 randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

node\_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol

#### Locations

79	<pre>// benefit is lost if 'b' is also tested.</pre>
80	<pre>// See: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/522</pre>
81	<u>if (a == 0) (</u>
82	return 0:
83	1
84	
85	uint256 c = a * b;

LOW A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

The block timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of SWC-116 randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

node\_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol

Locations

84 uint256 c = a \* b; 85 require(c / a == b, "SafeMath: multiplication overflow"); 86 87 88 return c;

LOW

A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are SWC-116 predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

node\_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol Locations



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Source file

contracts/libraries/math/WadRayMath.sol

## Locations

127	<pre>uint256 result = a * RAY;</pre>
128	
129	<pre>require(result / RAY == a, Errors.MULTIPLICATION_OVERFLOW;</pre>
130	
131	result += halfB;

LOW

## A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of SWC-116 randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

contracts/libraries/math/WadRayMath.sol

## Locations

131	result += halfB;
132	
133	<pre>require(result &gt;= halfB Errors ADDITION_OVERFLOW);</pre>
134	
135	return result / b;

LOW

#### A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

SWC-116

The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

node\_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol Locations

29	<pre>function add(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {</pre>
30	uint256 c = a + b;
31	<pre>require(c &gt;= a, "SafeMath: addition overflow");</pre>
32	
33	return c;

### A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are SWC-116 predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

contracts/libraries/math/WadRayMath.sol

Locations

99	**/
100	function rayMul(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) $\{$
101	if (a == 0) {
102	return 0,
103	1
104	
105	<pre>uint256 result = a * b;</pre>

LOW

A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

SWC-116 The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file contracts/libraries/math/WadRayMath.sol

Locations

185 uint256 result = a \* b; 186 187 require(result / a == b, Errors.MULTIPLICATION\_OVERFLOW); 188 189 result += halfRAY;

LOW

A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

SWC-116

The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

contracts/libraries/math/WadRayMath.sol	
Locations	

105	<pre>uint256 result = a * b;</pre>
106	
107	<pre>require(result / a == b, Errors.MULTIPLICATION_OVERFLOW</pre>
108	
109	result += halfRAY;

## A control flow decision is made based on The block.timestamp environment variable.

The block.timestamp environment variable is used to determine a control flow decision. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

contracts/libraries/math/WadRayMath.sol

## Locations

109	result += halfRAY;
110	
111	<pre>require(result &gt;= halfRAY, Errors.ADDITION_OVERFLOW)</pre>
112	
113	<pre>return result / RAY;</pre>



Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).

SWC-123

Source file contracts/lendingPool.sol

Locations

717	
718	return (
719	<pre>IERC20(asset).balanceOf(reserve_aTokenAddress),</pre>
720	<pre>IERC20(reserve.stableDebtTokenAddress).totalSupply(),</pre>
721	<pre>IERC20(reserve.variableDebtTokenAddress).totalSupply(),</pre>



The value of the function parameter "from" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations

<pre>function _beforeTokenTransfer(</pre>
<mark>address from</mark> ,
address to,
uint256 amount

#### Unused function parameter "to".

SWC-131

Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol

Locations



LOW

Unused function parameter "amount".

The value of the function parameter "amount" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

The value of the function parameter "to" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

## Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol
Locations

249address from,250address to,251vint256 amount252) internal virtual {}253}

## Analysis 4dcb9ffa-3855-4e7d-af3a-584ef34ba7c4

## Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 11:59:58 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep

Client Tool Mythx-Cli-0.6.21

Main Source File Tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		(LOW
0	0	3

# ISSUES

LOW Unused function parameter "from". The value of the function parameter "from" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131 Source file tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations 247 function \_beforeTokenTransfer( 248 <mark>address from</mark>, 249 250 address to, uint256 amount 251

LOW SWC-131

Unused function parameter "to".

The value of the function parameter "to" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

Source file tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations

248	<pre>function _beforeTokenTransfer(</pre>
249	address from,
250	<mark>address to</mark> ,
251	uint256 amount
252	) internal virtual {}

LC	W Unused function parameter "amount".
SWC	The value of the function parameter "amount" for the function "_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "_beforeTokenTransfer". -131
Source fil	e
tokeniza	tion/IncentivizedERC20.sol
Locations	i de la constante de la constan
249	address from,
250	address to,
251	uint256 amount
252	) internal virtual {}
253	.}
AL 0 0	

## Analysis 0c813c52-8d60-46ab-bfca-838632e2f8dd

# MythX

## Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 12:00:01 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Tokenization/StableDebtToken.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

(HIGH		(LOW
1	0	6

# ISSUES

HIC	GH	The arithmetic operation can overflow.
SWC-	-101	It is possible to cause an arithmetic overflow. Prevent the overflow by constraining inputs using the require() statement or use the OpenZeppelin SafeMath library for integer arithmetic operations. Refer to the transaction trace generated for this issue to reproduce the overflow.
Source file	е	
contracts	s/libra	ries/math/MathUtils.sol
Locations	;	
56	}	
57		
57	uint256	avo Minus One - avo - 1
50	01112250	
59		
60	uint256	expMinusTwo = exp > 2 ? exp - 2 : 0;

# LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*A0.6.8". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file contracts/tokenization/StableDebtToken.sol Locations

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0 pragma solidity ^0.6.8; 2 3

import {Context} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/GSN/Context.sol'; 4

LO	W State variable visibility is not set. It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "_timestamps" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private.
500-	108
Source file	e
contracts	:/tokenization/StableDebtToken.sol
Locations	
21	
22	uint256 private _avgStableRate;
23	<pre>mapping(address =&gt; uint40) _timestamps;</pre>
24	<pre>uint40 _totalSupplyTimestamp;</pre>

It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "\_totalSupplyTimestamp" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private.

## LOW

State variable visibility is not set.

SWC-108

Source file

contracts/tokenization/StableDebtToken.sol
Locations

22	uint256 private	_avgStableRate;
23	mapping(address	=> uint40) _timestamps

24 uint40 \_totalSupplyTimestamp;

25

26 constructor(

LOW Unused function parameter "from".

The value of the function parameter "from" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

# SWC-131

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations

247	
248	<pre>function _beforeTokenTransfer(</pre>
249	<mark>address <b>from</b>,</mark>
250	address to,
251	uint256 amount

#### Unused function parameter "to".

SWC-131

Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol

Locations



LOW

Unused function parameter "amount".

The value of the function parameter "amount" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

The value of the function parameter "to" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

## Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol
Locations

249address from,250address to,251vint256 amount252) internal virtual {}253}
### Analysis c735bc1c-fa4a-4e89-9725-ceabbd2138bc

#### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 12:00:06 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Tokenization/VariableDebtToken.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	1	7

# ISSUES

MED	NUI	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.
SWC	-113	This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).
Source fi	le	
contract	s/config	guration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Location	6	
132	if (prox	<pre>yAddress == address(0)) {</pre>
133	proxy =	new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
134	134 proxy.initialize(newAddress, address(this), params);	
135	_address	<pre>es[id] = address(proxy);</pre>
136	emit Pro	xyCreated(id, address(proxy));

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file contracts/tokenization/VariableDebtToken.sol

## Locations

3

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0

2 pragma solidity ^0.6.8;

4 import {Context} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/GSN/Context.sol';

LOW SWC-107

#### Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

 $\verb|contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol||$ 

#### Locations





Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).

# SWC-123

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Locations

- 132 if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {
- 133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
- 134 proxy.initialize(newAddress, address(this), params);
- 135 \_addresses[id] = address(proxy);
- 136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));



A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Locations

<pre>emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));</pre>
} else {
<pre>proxy.upgradeToAndCall(newAddress, params)</pre>
}
}

# LOW

Unused function parameter "from".

SWC-131

Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol

#### Locations

247	
248	<pre>function _beforeTokenTransfer(</pre>
249	<mark>address from</mark> ,
250	address to,
251	uint256 amount
250 251	address to, uint256 amount

LOW

Unused function parameter "to".

The value of the function parameter "to" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

The value of the function parameter "from" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations



LOW Unused function parameter "amount".

The value of the function parameter "amount" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations

249	address from,
250	address to,
251	<mark>uint256 amount</mark>
252	) internal virtual {}
253	}

### Analysis 48db364a-404d-4867-afab-71437ab170c0

#### Started

Finished	Thu Sep 24 2020 12:00:14 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)
Mode	Deep
Client Tool	Mythx-Cli-0.6.21
Main Source File	Contracts/Tokenization/Base/DebtTokenBase.Sol

# DETECTED VULNERABILITIES

HIGH		(LOW
0	1	7

# ISSUES

MED	NUI	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.
SWC	-113	This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).
Source fil	le	
contract	s/config	uration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Locations	6	
132	if (prox	<pre>yAddress == address(0)) {</pre>
133	<pre>133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();</pre>	
134	<mark>proxy.in</mark>	itialize( <b>newAddress</b> , address(this), <b>params</b> );
135	_address	<pre>es[id] = address(proxy);</pre>

136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));

LOW

A floating pragma is set.

The current pragma Solidity directive is "\*^0.6.8"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is SWC-103 especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file contracts/tokenization/base/DebtTokenBase.sol

# Locations

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: agpl-3.0

2 pragma solidity ^0.6.8; 3

4 import {Context} from '@openzeppelin/contracts/GSN/Context.sol';

LOW SWC-107

#### Read of persistent state following external call

The contract account state is accessed after an external call to a fixed address. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol

#### Locations





Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol Locations

- 132 if (proxyAddress == address(0)) {
- 133 proxy = new InitializableAdminUpgradeabilityProxy();
- 134 proxy.initialize(newAddress, address(this), params);
- 135 \_addresses[id] = address(proxy);
- 136 emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));



A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments). SWC-123

Source file

contracts/configuration/LendingPoolAddressesProvider.sol
Locations

<pre>emit ProxyCreated(id, address(proxy));</pre>
} else {
<pre>proxy.upgradeToAndCall(newAddress, params)</pre>
}
}

# LOW

Unused function parameter "from".

SWC-131

Source file

contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol

#### Locations

247	
248	<pre>function _beforeTokenTransfer(</pre>
249	<mark>address from</mark> ,
250	address to,
251	uint256 amount
249 250 251	address from, address to, uint256 amount

LOW

Unused function parameter "to".

The value of the function parameter "to" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer". SWC-131

The value of the function parameter "from" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations



LOW Unused function parameter "amount".

The value of the function parameter "amount" for the function "\_beforeTokenTransfer" of contract "IncentivizedERC20" does not seem to be used anywhere in "\_beforeTokenTransfer".

Source file contracts/tokenization/IncentivizedERC20.sol Locations

249	address from,
250	address to,
251	<mark>uint256 amount</mark>
252	) internal virtual {}
253	}